78'000 AFFECTED BY ILISU DAM?

Berne Declaration, 7 September 2000, Switzerland

At 55,000-78,000, the number of people potentially or actually affected by Turkey's Ilisu dam is much higher than has so far been estimated. A long series of project-specific, economic and political conditions must be fulfilled for the dam's resettlement program to comply with international standards. These are the main conclusions of an internal document on the Ilisu project which the Berne Declaration and the British Ilisu Dam Campaign released to the public on 7 September.

The Ilisu consortium has so far estimated the number of people affected by the Ilisu dam at 12,000-15,000. A new report by World Bank expert Ayse Kudat now puts the figure of people actually affected at 19,000-34,000, and the number of people potentially affected at 55,000-78,000. The report has been commissioned by the Swiss Export Risk Guarantee, which coordinates a consortium of international export credit agencies considering to fund the Ilisu dam. The Swiss advocacy group, The Berne Declaration (BD), and the British Ilisu Dam Campaign released the report to the public on 7 September.

Not only is the number of affected people much higher than expected. Ayse Kudat's report also identifies a long list of project-specific, economic and political conditions which must be fulfilled for the affected people to be successfully rehabilitated. The World Bank expert puts forward nine specific recommendations, among which the employment of illiterate farmers in urban areas which are plagued by rampant unemployment. Her report also indicates that a successful rehabilitation is only possible if martial law in the Kurdish area is lifted, and if the area profits from an economic upturn. The document gives no guidance on how to address these issues however.

In a critique of the resettlement report, the Berne Declaration points out that some of the conditions for successful rehabilitation have so far never been implemented in practice. In spite of this, the risk of failure lies squarely with the affected people, particularly since the export credit agencies are not prepared to make their funding conditional on the actual implementation of the rehabilitation program. "While these agencies intend to guarantee the risks of their exporters, no guarantees are given to the people affected by Ilisu", the BD's critique points out.

Ayse Kudat's report mentions that "there are a large number of people affected by previously constructed dams who are still waiting to be resettled, sometimes for many years". In the past 30 years, only about 100 families have been resettled every year. Commenting on the new report, Peter Bosshard of the Berne Declaration says: "If the Turkish authorities are serious about their commitment to international standards, they should start with the problems which they have already created. In the meantime, we will support the people affected by Ilisu in their resistance against a dam which again shifts all the risks to them.'

For more information:

Peter Bosshard, Berne Declaration, finance@evb.ch, www.evb.ch, ph. +41 1 277 70 07

Kate Geary, Ilisu Dam Campaign, ilisu@gn.apc.org, ph. +44 1865 200 550

(Annex)

Berne Declaration Comments on:

Ilisu Dam's Resettlement Action Plan (RAP)
Achieving International Best Practice
Ayse Kudat, August 7, 2000, Istanbul Turkey

1) Fundamental problems:

In some areas, the report clearly spells out the problems of the Ilisu dam as planned, and of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) more generally: "In the Turkish context, past failures have been particularly severe with respect to inadequate and inappropriate delivery of resettlement housing, lack of concern with the well-being of self-settlers, transparent participation of affected populations in resettlement decisions, and monitoring of social impacts during and after dam construction to generate lessons for future activities." (p. 6) "In fact, there are still a large number of people affected by previously constructed dams who are still waiting to be resettled, sometimes for many years." (p. 14) The report does not mention that many of these dams have been financed by the very same export credit agencies which are now considering to fund the Ilisu project.

The document does elaborate the fundamental institutional problems affecting Ilisu. "A number of institutions is involved, each acting independently with none having the ability to enforce full and timely coordination and implementation on the others." (p. 27)  "Clearly, the existing institutional arrangements will not suffice to meet the needs." (p. 6)

The report further establishes that the number of potentially and actually affected people is much larger than the project autorities and the export credit agencies (ECAs) had indicated so far. According to Sulzer Hydro, the leader of the Ilisu consortium, about 12,000 people will have to be resettled, and about 3,000 other people need to be compensated. According to the report, 19,000  - 34,000 people will be actually affected, and a total of 55,127 - 71,186 people are potentially affected (pp. 34, 37). This strongly increased figure deals a blow to the quality of the project preparation by the authorities and the ECAs.

At the same time, the report seems to be overly cautious in its figures. 71'186 is the figure of the 2000 surveys, while the 55,127 figure is based on the 1990 census. It is unclear why the older figures areused anyway. Further, the report discounts people who lose their land but do not pursue compensation as not being affected. This does not make logical sense and artificially reduces the number given for the actually affected people.

In some other instances, the report appears uncritical and euphemistic. In typical World Bank speak, a problem which so far has hardly ever been resolved (like providing economic opportunities to illiterate women) is turned into a "major challenge" (p. 17). The inexistant participation of the affected people in the RAP is called "limited" (p. 22). And the document uncritically reports the outcome of an opinion poll in which 52 % of the men and 42 % of the women are purported to have found the dam beneficial (p. 24). It does not mention how this poll was carried out, e.g. if state officials or security forces were present when the interviews were conducted. (This has been the experience of all NGO visits to the area so far.)

On p. 30, the report does mention that some communities "were not accessible for security reasons at the time of the socio-economic surveys". Generally, the author is however remarkably silent about how the participatory, bottom-up approach she recommends is supposed to take place within the given situation of political repression.

2) The conditions of success:

The report lists a large number of recommendations and conditions for successful resettlement and rehabilitation.

(a) Project and institutional level:

The report's Executive Summary lists nine specific recommendations, ranging from "promote participation" to "establish sound institutionaly mechanisms". More specificly, the document calls for "alternative income enhancing strategies" for rural landless people (p. 12). Otherwise, there is a "high risk that those who intend to self resettle will fall into greater destitution" (ibid.). The RAP should "focus on enhancing skills and promoting employment and self-employment opportunities, explicitly including women" (ibid.). "Measures are also needed to avoid channeling high levels of subsidized credit to the wealthiest groups among the affected populations." (p. 15) (As the report points out on p. 41, "land distribution is highly inequitable and a substantial compensation will be paid to a small number of land owners".) The project authorities and the Ministry of Education should make a special effort to "ensure full participation of girls from settlements affected by Ilisu in basic education programs" (p. 18). The RAP "should incorporate a Participation Action Plan and a Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism", and "gender issues require special consideration in enhancing participation" (p. 23). "There is also a need for independent monitoring, not to be equated with 'external' or 'foreign monitoring'." (p. 28) And the RAP should show how the General Directorate of Rural Services would overcome "both budget and land availability constraints", "and what guarantees there would be for it to receive an earmarked budget for Ilisu's resettlement" (ibid.). Finally, the resettlement planning has been insufficient so far. "Once a firm decision is taken for the construction of the dam and the finances are secured, resettlement choices will have to be re-established for all affected communities." (p. 31)

According to the World Bank's resettlement policy, affected people should be able to improve or at least regain their economic levelihood. Involuntary resettlement should be perceived as a development program, and should be dealt with from the earliest stages of project preparation. And the affected people need to be systematically informed and consulted during project preparation, and should be able to choose from a number of acceptable resettlement alternatives.

The recommendations of the new report do not center on the rights of the affected people, but on the aspects of project execution, and of compensation. Some of them have so far hardly ever been implemented in practice. "Promoting employment and self-employment opportunities" for peasants and farmers e.g. has become a standard receipe for World Bank resettlement projects, but has hardly ever worked. In the case of Ilisu, the risks will be even bigger, since the cities were most affected people would be resettled "are highly stressed with huge numbers of unemployed and displaced" (p. 43).

(b) Macro-economic level:

The report banks on an economic upturn in the project area in the near future to resolve the problems of resettlement. "If the current development scenario is unchanged and economic activity does not visibly increase, particularly in the urban sector, the displacement caused by the Ilisu project will merely add to the high rates of unemployment. If, on the other hand, the region's economic development kicks off within the next year or two, the landless from the affected communities in Ilisu may start making a gradual shift to an improved livelihood. Thus, whether the poor among the affected populations could be worse off depends on the near term economic and political outlook of the region." (p. 16)

(c) Security situation:

On p. 5, the report states: "(...) internal and external civil society organizations demand government intentions be put to the test in the context of the Ilisu Dam. This demand is articulated in the request for the creation of a free environment in which views concerning the construction of the Ilisu Dam can be openly expressed. The decisions concerning the resettlement choices for Ilisu and the normalization of the martial law conditions thus become closely interrelated." The author does not explicitely clarify whether she shares the view that participatory rehabilitation projects cannot be planned and carried out under martial law.

3) Conclusion:

The report does not analyse the economic, political, environmental and cultural impacts of the Ilisu dam. As far as resettlement and rehabilitation are concerned, it puts forward at least nine project-specific and institutional recommendations. Some of them have so far hardly ever worked in practice  in Turkey or in World Bank projects in other countries. The report counts on the economic situation of the region to improve, so that displaced people can find an income away from their land. It implies that martial law must be abandoned so that any participatory approaches to rehabilitation can be considered. And it tops the list of risks by pointing out that "the real test of this commitment (to the implementation of Ilisu's RAP) will be manifest in the RAP's implementation stage and especially in the annual budget allocations that are effectively made available to the RAP" (p. 36). Who will carry all these project-related, economic and political risks? Needless to say, the affected people, and most of all, the poor landless majority. This is even more the case since most export credit agencies refuse to make their loans or guarantees conditional on the actual implementation of the plans and promises of the project authorities. The impression arises that the export credit agencies insist on creating a new process of studies, recommendations and commitments in order to placate their public at home. Yet while they intend to extend guarantees to cover the risks of their exporters, no guarantees are given to the people affected by Ilisu  in spite of the negaitve track record of their earlier projects in Turkey.

As the report points out, "there are still a large number of people affected by previously constructed dams who are still waiting to be resettled". And "in the past 30 years resettlement was [only] provided for about 100 families annually" (p. 45). If the project authorities are really serious about their commitment to equitable rehabilitation programs which conform with international standards, they should start by resolving the problems which have already been created. ECA representatives have suggested that the Ilisu dam is a test case for Turkey's compliance with international standards, and that the country would have problems raising further export credits if it failed this test. The Berne Declaration and other NGOs continue to consider the projects which have already been implemented the test cases. They will support the people affected by Ilisu and their representatives who continue to oppose a new dam project which again shifts all the risks to them.

Peter Bosshard, Berne Declaration, 6 September 2000 Address of the author: Berne Declaration, P.O. Box 1327, 8031 Zurich, Switzerland; ph. +41 1 277 70 07, fax +41 1 277 70 01, finance@evb.ch, www.evb.ch.